commvita
Connected care platform
Standards

EHDS and WHO: how close commvita is, right by right

Prompted by a talk on the European Digital Identity wallet, we checked commvita against what the European Health Data Space asks for from the person’s side: their rights over the record, purpose before data, the wallet, and the minimum data a service should use. Five of the ten rights are in place today and two more are partly there. The wallet isn’t built.

Live vs demonstrated: Live — real, API-backed platform logic (wired end-to-end today) Demonstrated — representative control surface with seeded data / illustrative UI mock-up
© 2026 Commvita Digital Health Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.

1 What started this

In September, at an openEHR event, Zoltan Lantos of Ireland’s Department of Health gave a talk on the European Digital Identity wallet and what it means for health data. His slides set out, in four pictures, what the European Health Data Space looks like from the side of the person it’s for.

The first picture listed the rights a person has over their own record. The second put context and purpose ahead of any data: what’s going on for the person, what the service is for, and what they’ve agreed to. The third showed what the wallet does. The fourth traced a single transaction from the hospital that holds the data to the service that uses it, and it ended on one line we’d have written ourselves: the service uses the minimum data it needs for a defined purpose.

We’ve used his framing as a checklist, because it’s the clearest statement we’ve seen of what EHDS asks for in practice. He didn’t mention commvita, and nothing on this page suggests he’d endorse it. The measurements are ours, taken from the running platform at build B-740.

How to read the statuses. Live means the platform does it today, from real data, end to end. Demonstrated means there’s a working screen over seeded data. Not built means what it says. Where a right is only partly met, we say which part.

2 The person’s rights, one at a time

Five of the ten rights on his slide are in the patient portal today, and two more are partly there. Three aren’t: setting restrictions, sending a copy on, and access across borders.

Rightcommvita today
Access their health dataYes. Through the patient portal.
Download a copyYes. Their own record as FHIR. Where a category holds nothing, the download says so.
View who accessed their dataYes. A portal page shows their own access entries.
Appoint an authorised personYes. They can grant and revoke access. A carer can add to the profile but can’t change the person’s own words.
Insert information into their recordPartly. Their profile, communication needs and family history go into the same records staff read. Nothing goes into the clinical record.
Request rectificationYes, as a request. The subject access route accepts a correction request and sends it to the team the organisation has set up for these requests. If no team is set up, the request is still recorded.
Set access restrictionsNo. A person can’t stop a particular clinician seeing something. One related portal list is held only in server memory, so it’s lost on restart.
Opt out of data sharingPartly. They can object to secondary use from the portal, and research extracts check that objection before anyone is included. They can also leave a research study. A shared care opt-out can be recorded by staff, but nothing acts on it yet.
Send a copy to another portal or appNo. They can download a copy, and they can ask the organisation to send it on. Nothing sends it to another app for them.
Clinician access via MyHealth@EU, including emergency accessNo. There is no MyHealth@EU connection. Emergency access is covered in section 5.
The patient portal's Who has looked at your record list for a demonstration patient, showing two entries on 23 September 2026: a care coordinator who opened the whole person record and a first contact physiotherapist who opened the patient record, both for direct care, and a note that the list can't show anything from before recording began
What the person sees: who opened the record, what they opened, and on what basisCaptured from the running system, build B-740 · demonstration data; both reads made for this page

The access list is the one we’d point a sceptic at first. It names the account that opened the record, with its role and organisation. A line saying “a clinician viewed your record” doesn’t tell you anything you can act on. It also says what it can’t cover, because a list that only starts recording partway through a record’s life shouldn’t read as complete.

The opt-out sits beside a plain account of what it doesn’t do. It doesn’t affect direct care, doesn’t withdraw anyone from a study they agreed to join, and can’t recall data shared before the choice was made.

The National Data Opt-out switch in the patient portal, with text explaining that it excludes the record from research and planning extracts that rely on statutory authorisation, and three things it does not do
One switch, and what it doesn’t cover, in the same placeCaptured from the running system, build B-740 · demonstration data

Asking for a correction uses the same form as asking for a copy. The person picks one of six requests, and the form tells them they can only ask for their own data there.

The Ask for your data form in the patient portal with Correct something that is wrong selected, an optional note box, and a line saying requests on somebody else's behalf go to the organisation's information governance team
One front door for all six requests, set here to a correctionCaptured from the running system, build B-740 · demonstration data

Linked accounts is where a person lets somebody in. The limits are written on the screen itself.

The Linked accounts screen for a demonstration patient, showing one family member given access, an End their access button, and a panel headed What you cannot do here yet listing a parent acting for a child and a carer not registered with a health service
Somebody you trust, with what they can’t do stated on the pageCaptured from the running system, build B-740 · demonstration data

3 Purpose before data

His second slide started with the person: their clinical state, their life and goals, what the service is for, a professional’s judgement, and the uses they’ve approved. Only after that does data pick up meaning and get turned into something another system can use. Then the loop goes round again with the outcome as the new context.

That’s the shape commvita is built to. Its ontology has three layers: what things mean, how people and work move between services, and how the system adapts as circumstances change. We’ve written about it in how commvita is put together. The outputs on the slide line up like this.

On the slidecommvita todayStatus
FHIRThe person’s own record comes out as FHIR, and other systems can read from the platform in FHIR.Live
OMOPApproved research extracts are built as OMOP tables, de-identified before they leave. The research explainer shows it working.Live
European exchange formatThe format hasn’t been published in final form. commvita produces an International Patient Summary in FHIR from the person’s own record, and we don’t claim conformance to a format that doesn’t exist yet.Partly
Wallet documentSee section 4.Not built

The slide put openEHR at the centre, as the clinical backbone, so we’ll be exact about where commvita stands. It reads the international archetype catalogue and refers to archetypes by name. It doesn’t store records as openEHR, doesn’t ship archetype definitions, and can’t run openEHR queries. The reason isn’t a missing piece of code. The templates that would make storage openEHR are clinical content other people wrote and license, and picking them is a commercial decision we haven’t taken. So commvita shares the talk’s idea of a semantic layer in the middle, and that layer is its own.

4 The wallet does three jobs, and commvita does one of them on its own

The third slide named what the wallet is for: identifying and signing a person in, presenting chosen facts about them, and signing documents. Here’s each one against commvita.

1
Identification and sign-in. Not built. commvita doesn’t accept a wallet sign-in. The demonstration portal lets a person in with an NHS number and a date of birth so visitors can try it. That’s a convenience for the demo and it isn’t identity verification.
2
Presenting chosen facts. Not built. commvita can’t yet ask a wallet for one fact about a person, say that they’re over 18 or hold a valid prescription, and check it.
3
Signing. Live, without the wallet. commvita has its own signing service. A person can sign a document from the portal with a one-time code, and the platform keeps the evidence that goes with an advanced electronic signature under eIDAS rules. It doesn’t sign with the wallet.

On the fourth slide’s flow, commvita would sit on the right-hand side, as a service that asks a wallet for the least it needs and checks what comes back. That part isn’t built, and we’re not putting a date on it here.

5 The minimum necessary is already in the product

The last box on the fourth slide is the one that matters most to us. A service should use the minimum data it needs for a defined purpose. commvita already does that in places where it’s easy to get wrong, and each of these is a rule the platform holds in its own code and tests.

Home care
Only what the visit needsA home-care worker opening a visit sees who the person is, why they’re visiting, the risks, how the person likes to communicate and any recent concerns. They don’t see the full clinical record, because the visit doesn’t need it.
Registration
A count is enoughIf somebody tries to register a person who’s already known, a user without a clinical role is told how many services know them. Which services is clinical information, so it’s held back. The count is enough to stop a duplicate record.
Mental capacity
Only whether one existsIf the reader’s role doesn’t cover capacity assessments, they’re told only that one exists. Not what it found, and not how many there have been, because a count would hint at a contested history.
Lists of people
Date of birth only when neededA list shows a date of birth next to a name only when two names are the same. Otherwise the name is enough to pick the right person.
Research
De-identified before it leavesResearch extracts are de-identified, small counts are held back, and every extract is logged. Where a person’s objection applies to a study, it’s checked before anyone is included.
Messages
Addressed within reachInternal messages can only go to people in the sender’s own jurisdiction. A sender the platform can’t place reaches nobody. It doesn’t fall back to a default.

The platform held this rule while we were building the screens for this page. Two staff accounts asked to open a demonstration record and were refused, because the person was registered with a different practice and no care relationship had been recorded. Once a referral was recorded, they could open it, and both reads went into the log below and the person’s own list above.

The Legitimate Relationship Log for information governance staff: a table of accesses with user, role, patient initials, timestamp, care setting, access reason, relationship type, organisation, an anomaly flag on three bulk population-health queries, and a Challenge button on every row
Every access with a reason, people shown by initials, anomalies flagged, and a challenge on every rowCaptured from the running system, build B-740 · demonstration data; the top two rows are the reads made for this page
The honest edge is emergency access. A clinician in an emergency mustn’t be stopped from opening a record, so the platform can’t block it. It asks for a written reason, logs it, and puts it in front of the organisation’s information governance team and Caldicott Guardian, who can challenge it. Whether the reason was a good one is for that team to judge.

6 Where WHO comes in

WHO’s reference architecture for digital public infrastructure in health is still a draft for public comment. We’ve mapped commvita against its building blocks on a separate page, WHO DPI-H and EHDS alignment, so we won’t repeat the table here.

One WHO standard is worth a line of its own. commvita reads ICD-11 from WHO’s own service and never keeps a copy of the classification. WHO holds the copyright and publishes the licence, and reading from WHO means a clinician always codes against the current release. A deployment has to register with WHO to switch this on, so it isn’t connected in the demonstration.

7 What isn’t there yet

Put together, commvita is close to EHDS on minimum-necessary disclosure and on half of the person’s rights. It’s further away on restrictions, on sending data on, on the wallet and on cross-border connection. The gaps, in one place:

Where to see it in commvita

WhatRouteWho sees it
Who has looked at my record/portalThe person, signed in to the portal
Data choices and research opt-out/portalThe person
Someone I trust/portalThe person, and whoever they let in
Ask for my data, or a correction/portalThe person; the request reaches the organisation’s team
Emergency and legitimate access/legitimate-access-logInformation governance staff
Signing/esignStaff, and the person from the portal
© 2026 Commvita Digital Health Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved. Measured at build B-740Our assessment, not a conformity claimNon-SaMD